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Werner Güth and Hartmut Kliemt
From full to bounded rationality
The limits of unlimited rationality
Abstract: Deriving advice that can in fact be utilized by boundedly rational decision makers is
a central function of modeling choice making. We illustrate why this role is not being fulfilled
well by standard models of full rationality and that theories of bounded rationality are needed
not only for better predictions, but also for developing better advice. Our main point is that
one cannot succeed here without studying how theories of bounded rationality causally
influence the behavior of boundedly rational individuals. In view of such a causal role of
theories we discuss how advice of a theory of boundedly rational behavior can become
known, be followed among boundedly rational individuals and still be good advice.
1. Explications and explanations
Ideally the theoretical concepts of social science should be precise, fruitful,
simple and similar to the pre-theoretical ones which they substitute. The process
in which a theoretical substitute for a pre-theoretical concept is worked out – as
well as the result of this process – is called an „explication“  (see on the concept
of an explication originally Carnap 1956). An explication has descriptive as well
as normative aspects. On the one hand, the general use of the pre-theoretical
concept must be described, on the other hand, a more precise, theoretically
fruitful, yet simple and similar concept must be formed and established as a
„standard“ .
In the so-called „moral sciences“ , explicating the concept of „ rationality“  is one
of the most important challenges. First, „ rational”  and „ irrational”  are prominent
evaluative classifications in daily as well as scientific life. This renders the task
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of explicating them an important one. Second, the actual use of the term
„ rational“  varies so much that even the most careful description will not reveal a
common conceptual core.
Avoiding part of the challenge, traditional rational choice theorists have not paid
much attention to the everyday or common use of the term „ rational“  or to actual
behavior. They established their standards of rationality – thus fixing the
meaning of the term „ rational”  – independently of or even counter to the facts.
For instance, even if most individuals used the term „ irrational“  for charac-
terizing polluting behavior in an n-person „public bads’ ”  experiment, the typical
rational choice theorist would tend to classify the participants’  behavior as
„ rational” . As a matter of fact, if many people should say that individuals who
do not co-operate in a one-off classical two-person prisoners’  dilemma situation
are behaving „ irrationally“ , this will not make the rational choice theorist think
twice.
If philosophers like Edward McClennen (1990) insist that „backward induction“
in the finitely repeated prisoners’  dilemma must be given up since it just cannot
be rational not to co-operate at least to some extent in such situations, the
adherent of theories of perfect rationality will remain unmoved. Her concept of
„ full rationality”  is formed „deductively”  rather than „ inductively”  and justified
by a priori normative rather than a posteriori descriptive reasoning. Common
usage of the terms „ rational“  and „ irrational“  as well as philosophical analyses
starting from common intuitions seem simply misguided to the traditional
rational choice theorist. She would claim that neither actual behavior nor actual
usage of terms should determine the „proper“  meaning of the term „ rational“  in
a scientific or philosophical context.
The „a priori”  approach is clearly a possibility. But it must be noted, too, that by
establishing standards of rationality independently of or counter to the facts, the
rational choice theorist turns „ rationality“  into what may be called a „ counter-
factual concept“ . If we take such an approach to its extreme, we get a very
refined rationality-concept that may be appealing to the theorist, in particular the
decision and the game theorist. However, it neither relates directly to the
understanding of real people, nor does it apply to their behavior, nor can it form
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a general basis for formulating advice that is helpful for merely boundedly
rational individuals.
It becomes even doubtful whether there is still sufficient continuity between the
pre-theoretical and the theoretical concept of rationality to use the same term for
both. Since the continuity issue must not be taken lightly, the question arises of
whether there may be more „ realistic“  explications of the rationality concept in
terms of so-called „bounded rationality” . As in the somewhat parallel case of
„perfect“  and „workable competition“ , such explications would uphold some
essential elements of the purely theoretical „ normative concept“  (normative at
least in the sense of an ideal type), while moving the concept closer to real
behavior in other regards.
Construing a reflective equilibrium as to the proper meaning of „ rationality“
within the concept of „ bounded rationality“  raises fundamental questions of a
very general nature. We shall address such questions subsequently in an intuitive
way by discussing quite trivial examples borrowed from game theory. But we do
not intend to play by the rules of the traditional game theoretic discourse in
which acceptance of some extreme assumptions is required from all participants.
Rather, we are willing to challenge these assumptions whenever necessary or
suitable.
In the next section, the relation between theory and advice is discussed in a
general manner (2.). Then the decision environment on which we shall focus for
illustrative purposes is introduced (3.). After specifying more formally the
concept of advice (4.), the relation between knowing and complying with advice
is discussed (5.). In the main section, responses to advice are studied (6.). In the
subsequent section a „ causal”  rather than „ logical”  interpretation of the role of
advice as behavioral guidance is suggested and related to the concept of a semi-
normative theory (7.). Some general observations on the continuity between pre-
theoretical and theoretical explications of concepts of rationality bring the
argument back full circle and conclude the paper (8.).
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2. Theory and advice
It seems ridiculous to claim that conventional game theory is a theory of how
real people interact. It is „descriptive“  merely in the sense of characterizing what
would happen if inhabitants of a world of fully rational beings were to interact
rationally with each other. In this hypothetical world – at least in a way – the
normative perspective coincides with the descriptive one since – by assumption
– rational actors do what rational actors ought to do. Advice as to what rational
actors ought to do in view of the rationality ascribed to them coincides with
predictions of what they will do on behalf of their rationality. What this will be,
of course, can be derived only after the rules of the game in question have been
specified. Once those rules are fixed, a closed theory of rational play would
offer a suggestion or an advice of how the players should – and would – play.
Under the assumption that it be completely followed by all players concerned,
such a closed theory can eliminate the problem of strategic uncertainty by
providing completely specified, unambiguous advice of how to play (see
Harsanyi and Selten 1988).
The practical value of advice to a world of rational beings is quite precarious in
a world of less than fully rational individuals. As in second-best theory, where
removing some obstacles to efficiency can lead to yet inferior results if other
obstacles remain in place, approximating ideal behavior in the real world may
not be the best strategy. In fact, criteria for what is good advice in the real world
are rather unclear. Although arriving at more clarity here is quite difficult, some
hints can be given at the outset:
As a minimum, good advice should be „workable“  or „ truly prescriptive“  in
taking into account the limited cognitive and other faculties of real people.
Individuals must be able to understand and to carry out the advice with the
„cognitive technology“  at their command. But being „ truly prescriptive“  or
„workable“  is not sufficient if we are searching for good advice. Neither is it
sufficient that a given workable advice as a matter of fact yielded good results.
In the concept of good advice both, procedural elements as well as aspects of
material success seem to play a role. For instance, last week’s advice that people
born in November should spend their whole savings on a German Lotto ticket
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„since the stars were favorable“ , was simple and may have yielded a tremendous
return on investment for some „peculiar“  individual who followed that advice.
But even for the winner the advice was certainly not „good advice”  in any mea-
ningful sense of that term. First, there was no systematic relation of the advice to
some reasonable theory. Second, ex ante, success could not be predicted with a
probability meeting the requirements of reasonable aspiration levels. Third, the
advice could not have been generally observed and still have led to a reasonable
expectation of success for all addressees of the advice.
What is „ reasonable”  has not been specified yet. We believe that discussing the
concept of „ good advice“  will shed some light on the notion of rationality within
the concept of „ bounded rationality“  and thereby also on what is reasonable. We
also believe that the discussion of the self-referential aspects of advice giving in
theories of (boundedly) rational behavior will shed some interesting new light
on the topics of „ self-fulfilling”  and „ self-refuting prophecy”  as traditionally
discussed in social science. Like the bank that will indeed crash if the theory that
it will crash is commonly believed, a theory’s advice may support itself as good
advice if commonly adhered to – or vice versa.
3. The decision environment
From here on, we will refer to the theory of rational behavior under
consideration as t. The theory t is a set of descriptive and possibly also of
prescriptive „ sentences“  or „statements“ . Let t apply to a class Γ of games G
with strategy profiles S. In the most simple case the theory t assigns a subset of
S as (universal) advice to all elements G from the considered class of games Γ.
For the sake of specificity and illustration, we shall rely on the following
simplifying assumptions about the class of problems considered here:
Let I:={ 1, 2, ..., n} , n≥2, be the set of players and let Γ denote the class of all
games G with
(A.0) G=(S1, S2, ..., Sn; u1, u2, ..., un);
where for all i∈I the
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Si  is the set of strategy profiles s=(s1, s2, ..., sn)
ui are mappings ui: S → R, ui(s)∈R, which represent the individuals’  
preferences by a conventional cardinal utility measure.
Assumption:
(A.1) The decision environment can be adequately described as in (A.0).
4. Formal concepts of advice
Due to (A.1) we can restrict ourselves to considering advice ϕ as a mapping that
assigns to each G ∈ Γ a profile of subsets of the strategy sets of G.  More
specifically, we assume that for all games G from the relevant class Γ the theory
t of boundedly rational play specifies for each player i some set of strategies
from his strategy set as advice ϕi:
(A.2)  ∀G ∈ Γ, ∀ i∈I: ø ≠ ϕ(G)⊆Si.
As opposed to particular advice which addresses some non-empty proper subset
of the individuals I who are going to play G, let universal advice address all
players i∈I simultaneously. More specifically,
(D.1) For any G ∈ Γ particular advice is a set ϕJ(G) of strategy profiles sJ
=(si)i∈J for some subgroup J of the player set I deemed ” rationally“  eligible by
the theory t of (boundedly) rational play of games G ∈ Γ from which the advice
is derived.
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(D.2) For any G ∈ Γ universal advice is the subset ϕ(G)⊆S of strategy profiles
deemed „ rationally“  eligible by the theory t of (boundedly) rational play of
games G ∈ Γ from which the advice is derived.
We require that universal advice ϕ(G) can be decomposed such that




Requirement (A.3) is quite strong. For example, in a standard „battle of the











2  , s
2















0, 0 2, 1
Figure 1
Such coordination of specific actions among two players, where the choice of
one player must be contingent on the choice made by the other, cannot be
accomplished if (A.3) obtains. It would be possible only to give the advice to
play one of the strategies leading to an equilibrium. However, this advice would
amount to ϕ(G)=S.
Let us assume that particular advice for some subgroup of the whole set of
individuals can be decomposed likewise. Unless indicated otherwise, the
assumptions (A.1-A.3) will be made throughout in this paper.
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(D.3) Universal advice is unambiguous on a game G iff |ϕ(G)|=1 and it is
ambiguous on G iff |ϕ(G)|>1.
(D.4) Particular advice is unambiguous for a subset J of all players iff |ϕi(G)|=1
for every player i∈J and it is ambiguous iff |ϕi(G)|>1 for some player i∈J.
5. Knowing and following advice
Whether for an individual i∈I having received advice ϕi(G) it is good policy
(not) to act upon the advice depends on circumstances c.
(D.5) If an individual i in a game G∈Γ under circumstances c is disposed to act
according to ϕi(G), we say that she complies with ϕi(G).
Compliance as used here does not amount to actual behavior but only to the
assent and intentions of the individual. Individuals who are „ theory compliant“
intend or plan to act according to the theory. But individuals who are compliant
may still deviate from their plans. In particular, individuals may make mistakes
in carrying out their intentions.
The most conventional compliance and knowledge assumptions are:
(C) For all G ∈ Γ, all players i∈I comply for all circumstances with the advice
ϕi(G).
(K) For all G ∈ Γ, among all players i∈I the (universal) advice ϕ(G) and
compliance (C) are common knowledge.
If the advice of theory t and compliance of its addressees are common
knowledge, then all individuals know that they receive the same advice ϕ(G)
and intend to follow it. Of the known advice ϕ(G) only „part“  ϕi(G) applies
directly to the actions of i∈I. Each theory compliant individual i intends to go
along with her own advice ϕi(G). Of course, since individuals have disjoint
strategy sets, their particular advice will be disjoint as well. But if individuals
are fully rational and thus do not face any cognitive constraints in reaching
inferences, then what individuals know or can know converges among
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individuals. Advice is no exception to this. In terms of a strict application of
theory t, each and every individual j∈I will reach the same conclusion for each
individual i∈I. Therefore if, according to the rules of game G, the theory t of
how to play it is common knowledge, then the (universal) advice ϕ(G) is
commonly known, too.
But this does not imply that players can fully predict other players’  behavior.
Uncertainty will arise in so-called games of „ incomplete information”  (see
Harsanyi 1967/8). Here players would know the type distribution, but would not
know the actual types involved. In such games a closed theory t of rational
behavior would fully specify the advice for all types. But since at least some
types remain private information, there is uncertainty about which advice would
apply. To put it slightly otherwise, which advice of the theory t actually applies
is contingent on type, but the conditional advice itself is commonly known if the
theory is commonly known.
In classical rational choice modeling „all is known”  commonly, since all
individuals are in command of the theory of rationality t itself, fully theory
compliant and can instantaneously derive all of t’ s relevant implications. The
remaining uncertainties are purely stochastic and can be incorporated in standard
ways by expected utility theory.
We can now define – in honor of O. Morgenstern – what may be called the
„ theory absorption criterion”  for an ideal setting:
(D.6) A theory t is absorbable in a class of games, Γ, if for all G∈Γ common
knowledge of t along with condition (K) does not provide a reason against
compliance (C) with t’ s (universal) advice ϕ(G).
Common knowledge of t relates to its predictive as well as its prescriptive
content, whereas (K) concerns t’ s prescriptive or advice-related aspects.
Equilibrium theory (see Cournot 1838; Nash 1951) claims to be „absorbable”  in
the sense of (D.6): For a class Γ, all players can know a classical theory t of
fully rational behavior in any G∈Γ, can be compliant with its advice, and on the
premise of universal compliance will never have good reason to prefer not to
follow theory t’ s advice. In short, if a theory t is absorbable then, if t is
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becoming known, this should not be detrimental to the quality of t’ s predictions
and prescriptions as evaluated by the actors themselves.
Ideally a theory t of fully rational behavior should even be self-supporting in the
sense that common knowledge of t along with (K) provides a good reason to
comply with the theory’s advice. Indeed, the existence of unambiguous advice
of a commonly known theory t along with (K) provides a reason for intending to
follow t’ s advice. But if advice is ambiguous in the sense of (D.3), it is not clear
what it amounts to in behavioral terms (the issue of actually behaving rather
than merely intending to behave according to t will be addressed in the next
section 6.). Then t will in general not be self-supporting since even common
knowledge of t does not give us a good reason to believe that its predictions hold
good and its prescriptions apply. Likewise, the advice of playing one of the strict
equilibria in the battle of the sexes game mentioned before violates (A.3) and
therefore does not imply a definite recommendation for individual choices.
Theories t leading to vague advice can be absorbable due to the their very
vagueness. But in such cases absorbability obviously does not amount to much.
The substantive constraint that rational choice is forward-looking and evaluates
all choices in terms of their future causal consequences is relevant to all forms of
choice making. It is not specific to interactive situations. The formal
requirement that preferences and beliefs fulfill axioms such that they can be
represented by appropriate utility and probability measures is not specific to
interactive situations either. For such situations the concept of absorbability of
the theory is an additional requirement. It constitutes the most central standard
specific to interactive situations. It must be met by any a priori theory t
explicating what rationality should mean for some class of games Γ.
This standard can be met by theories of full rationality for some classes of
games. However, outside classical or extreme rational choice modeling the
preceding conclusions about common knowledge as well as the absorbability of
theories seem either precarious or inapplicable. It is useful to look at some of the
reasons why this is so, to classify and categorize them and then turn again to the
issue of theory absorption in a bounded rationality context.
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6. Responding to advice
Let us assume for the following that no incomplete information games are
included in Γ. Therefore besides common knowledge of the advice, player types
are common knowledge. Given these premises, let us scrutinize the relationship
between advice and behavior more closely.
6.1. Unique advice and fully rational responses
To begin with, let us make some heroic assumptions: First, the theory t of
rational play for the class Γ is such that for all G ∈ Γ the theory t implies
definite advice in the following sense:
(A.4) ∀G ∈ Γ: |ϕ(G)|=1.
Second, all players do not only intend to act according to what they accept in
theory (C),but beyond (K) it is also common knowledge among them that they
do in fact act that way (with probability 1). Knowing the theory t and the advice
ϕ(G), players also know what behavior to expect from other players in G.
If advice (ϕ1(G), ϕ2(G), ...,ϕn(G))=(s1, s2, ..., sn) ∈ S is a singleton – that is, if
(A.4) applies – it is fully specified what players who fulfill (C) intend to do. All
act upon the universal advice received, know the content of that advice and
know exactly what it means in behavioral terms to follow the advice ϕ(G) of
theory t.
Assuming perfect rationality and decomposing ϕ(G) as ϕ(G)= (ϕi(G), ϕ-i(G))
and (ϕ1(G), ϕ2(G), ...,ϕi-1(G), si ,ϕi+1(G), ..., ϕn-1(G), ϕn(G)), respectively,
the best reply requirement amounts to the demand
(BR) ∀G ∈ Γ, ∀ i∈I, ∀si∈Si: ui(ϕi(G), ϕ-i(G)) ≥ ui(si, ϕ-i(G)).
Along with (C) and (K), condition (BR) amounts to the classical definition of an
equilibrium. Better advice cannot be given to any individual if all individuals do
in fact behave according to the advice.
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Given the assumption that behavior coincides with advice, what may be called
„behavioral equilibrium”  exists if „ advice equilibrium”  does and vice versa.
That this is so is assumed by practically all theories of fully rational behavior.
But exactly at this point we need to bridge the gap between theory and actual
behavior. There must be a causal link between the theory t’ s advice and the
behavior of individuals. Without a causal link between a theory t’ s advice – as
perceived by its addressees – it would be pure magic should behavior
correspond to advice. But can such a causal link legitimately be assumed to exist
and if so, how does it work? To answer this question by simply assuming that
advice and behavior coincide is not good enough in theories of boundedly
rational behavior. For, from the empirical point of view of merely boundedly
rational behavior, it is by no means obvious that advice and behavior coincide.
Of course, individuals could violate (C) and behave intentionally contrary to
advice. But this is not the essential point. The essential point is that even if
individuals intend to be theory compliant, they might still make mistakes and, as
we shall argue below, they might simply be unable to follow a theory t’ s best
advice. This problem is particularly relevant if the theory t, in deriving its
advice, is presupposing fully rational individual behavior according to (BR). – It
is exactly here that some of the more interesting topics concerning the
relationship between fully and boundedly rational behavior are located.
6.2 Unique advice and boundedly rational behavior
If we think of real individuals with their several „ real”  limitations, then even if
(A.4) is fulfil led and advice unambiguous, the reasoning leading to the selection
of an equilibrium under theory compliant best reply behavior will apply merely
in very simple cases (for a more extended discussion of „ complexity“ , see 6.3
below). For instance, if in a two by two game each decision maker is advised to
use a strictly dominant strategy, and if the performance of the advice singles out
a payoff dominant equilibrium, then individuals should be expected to follow
the advice in practice. Moreover, their behavior will amount to best response
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behavior in such simple cases, regardless of the assumption that they face
emotional and cognitive constraints in their choice making.
However, this coincidence of the behavior of boundedly rational individuals
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Figure 2
Assume that the game of figure 2 is introduced to both players while both are
present and aware of the presence of each other. Through this publicness of the
introductory event, the players acquire a kind of „working common knowledge“
of the game. They know that the other must know it etc. Moreover, assume that
there is no „ cheap talk“  among the players during the public event. Finally, after
the matrix has been introduced, the players are separated such that no commu-
nication is possible between them when they are actually making their choices.
If we focus exclusively on pure strategies in the game of figure 2, we have three
payoff-undominated strategy combinations that are not in equilibrium and a
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strategies. If for such a game, G, advice ϕi(G) would suggest to each player the
choice of her dominant strategy, then fully rational players would intend to act
accordingly. In a „ full rationality setting“ , this would clearly be the only
acceptable outcome. But it is not an intuitively appealing outcome for human
individuals and their common sense.
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Assume therefore that players are not fully rational but willing to go against the
dominance principle under certain circumstances. If the commonly known
theory of boundedly rational play t that allows for playing strictly dominated




2  ) for the game, G, of figure 2,
then this advice could be followed without self-refutation among satisficing
players (see Simon 1955). If such players endorse aspiration levels of, say, 100
each, none would have reason not to comply with the advice. The aspiration





2 ). In that sense the theory of boundedly rational behavior induces genuine
strategic interdependence where a theory of full rationality would have
individuals look only at the payoffs of their own dominant strategy.




2 ) only if her
theory t descriptively predicts that other individuals will endorse appropriate
aspiration levels and therefore follow the advice. This provides a first glimpse of
how descriptive and normative components are interwoven within a bounded
rather than a full rationality approach. A player with a fixed aspiration level of,
say, 100, will be satisfied with the result of observing the theory t iff, as a
matter of fact, her co-player goes along with the theory, too. Her co-player must
start from a compatible aspiration level as well etc.
The interaction between predictive and evaluative aspects of advice generating
theories goes much further, though. In the full rationality context, the normative
theory t could simply be used to generate the predictions on which its own
normative prescriptions rest. Fully rational individuals would simply observe the
prescriptions of t and then transform them into predictions. However, now
something needs to be said about how individuals are actually dealing with
theories. One obvious aspect of this emerges if we take into account the limited
ability of players to cope with the complexity of strategic advice. In particular, a
theory t of boundedly rational behavior may predict that some advice ϕ may be
too complex to be followed. Then the assumption that the addressees of advice
will behave according to the advice no longer holds. Let us briefly look at the
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issue of cognitive constraints first and then turn to emotional constraints before
facing the intricate problem of ambiguity.
6.3 Cognitive limitations and complexity
Conventionally, the issue of complexity is illustrated by the example of chess
playing. In chess, conceivably players might learn a „ choreography“  of the
moves for a specific way of playing the game based on the theory of „ rational
chess play“ . The play, in the sense of two sequences of moves – one for each
player – is the result of strategies. However, the play is not the same thing as a
strategy profile. Even if the strategic advice ϕ(G)=(ϕ1(G), ϕ2(G)) of the theory
were – as assumed here for the sake of argument – a singleton, there would be
no way for human players to memorize full chess strategies ϕi(G)∈Si, i=1, 2.
Real players – and real machines as well – must rely on simplifying advice rules
at some point. Bad chess players will rely on very simple advice rules, good
players presumably on more complicated ones. In any event, there will be no
complete, complex casuistic, but rather a set of relatively simple advice rules
employed by the players with some complementary casuistics.
Players will apply advice rules, but in each situation they will, as they go along,
construe the decision situation to which they apply the advice rules. Moreover,
unlike in a computer chess program, there will always be implicit or tacit
instances of violating the advice rules that cannot be specified in advance (on
implicit knowledge, see Polanyi 1962). In a specific situation which is
unforeseen by the boundedly rational player himself (and perhaps unforeseeable
altogether), there may be „a reason to deviate”  unspecified by the advice rules,
but fully plausible to the human mind (links with this range from the antique
„ topoi“  – Aristotle – to the modern „unless“  clauses in expert systems).
Responding to the need to rely on advice rules, complexity may be the origin of
predictable behavior (as e.g. claimed in Heiner 1983), but it clearly remains a
source of unpredictability as well. Complexity in the relevant sense may emerge
easily even in extremely simple games if we allow for ascending levels
reflection. The so-called guessing game may serve as an illustration here. In a
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very simple version of this game, n≥2 individuals j=1, 2, ..., n must name a
number from the set { 0, 1, 2, ..., 100} . The guesses sj of all players are summed
up and averaged to yield half of the average according to ( sj
j =1
n
∑ )/ 2n. The player i




Since the maximum of all guesses is determined by n*100, half of the average
bids cannot exceed 50. Therefore, all rational players i will exclude all bids si
>50. In view of this, any rational individual should come to the conclusion that
no rational individual will bid more than 50. However, then the maximal sum of
bids is clearly n*50, and nobody should guess more than 25. In turn, the
maximal sum becomes n*25 etc.
The preceding line of argument clearly depends on the presumption that (C), (K)
and (BR) apply, and hence every player assumes the others follow the
„ logically”  derived advice. But an individual who starts to reflect on whether or
not advice once given will be followed, may eventually become entangled in
such a complex web of thoughts that he could no longer handle the complexity.
This inability – as has been observed frequently – may look like adopting a
mixed strategy: A boundedly rational player who starts engaging the complexi-
ties of strategic interaction may become unpredictable to himself and others
simply because she cannot draw all conclusions from her own model of the
situation. This is an interesting justification for a behavioral and not merely
expectational interpretation of mixed strategies. But it should be noted, too, that
this view of mixed strategies applies only in a bounded rationality and not in a
perfect rationality framework.
6.4 Emotional limitations and weakness of the will
Cognitive complexity is not the only relevant influence. Thinking of the chain
store paradox or centipede games (see Selten 1978 and also Rosenthal 1981) one
can well imagine that real human players might understand and accept the logic
of backward induction. At the same time, due to motivational limitations they
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may not want to follow the unique advice of the theory that they fully
understand and know to apply in simple situations like centipede games. For
Selten (1990) such deviations from the precepts of backward induction form a
clear instance of boundedly rational as opposed to fully rational behavior. But
others have argued that a concept of full rationality that implies backward
induction is inadequate (e.g. McClennen 1990). According to this view, some
modifications of the present concept of full rationality must be made if a
reflective equilibrium in explicating the concept of rationality is to be reached
(see section 1 above).
It may well be that some far-reaching modifications of the standard concept of
full rationality are necessary. However, it seems quite doubtful that the
arguments presented so far are sufficient to show this. At least some cautionary
remarks seem appropriate. First, the argument cannot plausibly be restricted to
sequential games and backward induction. As the examples of the guessing
game and the game of figure 2 show, one-off games pose problems that would
require similar modifications. Second, the alleged need for a modification of the
rationality concept may in the last resort be based entirely on emotional
reactions. Third, the modified concept of rationality that eventually emerges if
emotional reactions are factored in may be one of bounded rather than full
rationality.
All the problems mentioned so far will arise even if advice is universal and
unambiguous. Ambiguous advice raises additional problems. Some we will now
briefly address and then come back to the more general methodological points of
explicating the concept of rationality adequately.
6.5 Ambiguity of advice
Clearly, if for a class of games Γ the theory of rational play implies unambi-
guous advice and if the singleton set ϕ(G) is assumed to be common knowledge,
then in every game G ∈ Γ an equilibrium should be selected. This holds good if
players expect each other to comply with it, to act in fact upon it and then react
optimally to the advice (see Aumann and Brandenburger 1995).
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Even critics of the exclusive focus on equilibria in traditional noncooperative
game theory would not deny this (see, e.g., Sugden 1991). But they would still
insist that the assumption that for a class of games Γ the theory of rational play
implies unambiguous advice is farfetched unless the class Γ is a very restricted
one (in particular, if unambiguous advice has to meet certain plausible standards
of consistency that would rule out that the theory t could by its advice select
among equilibria). They maintain that there will always be games for which any
reasonable theory t implies an advice vector |ϕ(G)|>1.
If |ϕ(G)|>1, then there is at least one player i∈I  for whom |ϕi(G)|>1. Even if the
other players knew the advice ϕ(G) and knew that all players intended to act
according to the advice, none of the players would know which action the player
i should and therefore would take. There would be at least two acts compliant
with the advice ϕ(G) of the theory t.
One might represent this uncertainty by expectational probability distributions
pj i endorsed by the individuals j≠i, if |ϕi(G)|>1 obtains. Of course, pki≠pji is
possible. In traditional game theoretic reasoning all k, j ∈I would have the same
views pki=pj i in common. As deductive theory has it, such common views
would emerge as the result of some procedure or other applied to common priors
obtaining on some ultimate level of analysis. However, it is hardly conceivable
that the sophisticated methods of advanced formal game theory (as, e.g., in
Harsanyi and Selten 1988) would represent what is actually going on in the
minds of boundedly rational players. Boundedly rational players can manage
only very restricted problems. They proceed inductively rather than deductively,
looking selectively at certain aspects of the game, construing the action situation
to fit their limited cognitive capabilities and eventually applying some rules of
thumb rather than optimal decision rules to derive an advice as to how to act.
But instead of dealing with such problems in the abstract, let us again discuss a
specific example. Consider
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           table of the game                               criteria for player 1
s





























1,3 1,4 6,6 1 6 (1/3)8
Figure 3












2 ). But can
we restrict advice to such pure strategies?
Since in the end each player must choose to do something, and all acts that can
be „done“  are already listed in the table, mixed strategies cannot be „ chosen“  in
the proper sense of the term. The advice to randomize strategies is viable only if
there is such an option. In that case, the choice of the relevant „ random device“
amounts to the choice of an additional strategic option.
If present, the option to randomize should explicitly show up as an additional
strategic choice besides the other choices given in the table. If, for example, in






















1 . Physically ,this option might
emerge from having access to dice or a coin to be thrown in an appropriately
defined random experiment, or even the observation of some „ random event”  in
the environment (where we neglect the difficulty that without commitment
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power the decision to choose according to the random result would still have to
be made).
If options to randomize do not exist, then players cannot choose „ mixed“ -stra-
tegies. Players may nevertheless intend to follow the advice to mix if their
theory t of rational play suggests that. However, for boundedly rational
individuals, intentions and actual behavior are two different things. In fact,
experimental evidence shows that players with limited memory capacity who
intend to randomize their strategies according to some given distribution are
hard-pressed and prone to show severely biased behavior (see Kareev 1992).
As opposed to „behavioral”  there is „perceived”  strategy mixing. A player k
who is uncertain about the behavior of her co-player j may express her
uncertainty about his choices formally by treating him as if he were playing a
mixed strategy. Such mixed strategies are like „beauty in the eye of the
beholder” . The advice ϕ to „ choose”  such a „mixed strategy” , that is, to behave
accordingly, does not make much sense. As far as the choice of strategies is
concerned, only a behavioral and not a perceptual interpretation seems
appropriate. However, only pure strategies – including, though, the choice of a
random mechanism or random device – can be chosen in the proper sense of that
term.
If only pure strategies can be chosen, then in the example of figure 3 advice
must single out one or several pure strategies. In view of (A.3) ,the advice
„select an equilibrium”  does not do. But the advice „ select one of the strategies
that lead to an equilibrium!“  amounts to













Since this advice does not exclude any option, it is in fact without content. Even
if ϕ(G) was made known in a public event, this fact would not give rise to any
more definite expectations of the players.
The ambiguity of the advice of choosing only strategies that are part of some
equilibrium may not be of much practical relevance. Boundedly rational
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decision makers will not think in terms of equilibria anyway. They will use
some rule of thumb or other. But such rules of thumb as conventionally used by
boundedly rational decision makers may, and in all likelihood will, lead to
contradictory advice in the game of figure 3 as well. Therefore, relying on
boundedly rational behavior may not overcome the difficulty.
To give just one example of how each of the strict equilibria may be singled out
by a plausible rule of thumb (for a recent experimental study illustrating such, in
their terminology, „pessimistic” , „ naive”  and „optimistic”  rules of thumb, see
Costa-Gomez et al. unpub., 2000):
Strategies s
1
i  , i=1, 2, yield the largest worst-case payoff. These strategies are
singled out by a maxi-min rule of thumb.
Strategies s
2
i  , i=1, 2, yield the highest expectation if each player forms expecta-
tions about the co-player’s behavior in the somewhat Laplacean way of
ascribing an equal likelihood to each choice of the co-player. These strategies
are singled out by the advice of maximizing expected payoff under an equal




i  , i=1, 2, yield the largest possible outcome. These strategies are
singled out by a maxi-max rule of thumb.
If decision makers know that the three preceding rules of thumb are plausible
candidates and at the same time do not know which one is in fact used, they
cannot draw any further conclusions from this information. As long as none of
the rules of thumb is privileged over the others, it does not help individuals to
mutually emulate their boundedly rational ways of decision making. Putting
themselves in each other’s shoes, they still end up with the advice vector












2 } ) which does not exclude
anything from consideration.
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In a sense, such null advice is just an extreme case of ambiguous advice. Players
need sources other than the theory t and its derived advice ϕ(G) for predicting
choices. Nonunique advice will leave players somewhat at a loss even if they
assume that empirically individuals know the theory t and intend to follow its
advice. Expected behavior must be constrained by some facts or on empirical
grounds (e. g. „ conventions” ) if individuals are to receive more definite advice
from the theory t (on the evolution of conventions, see the experimental studies
by Berninghaus and Ehrhart, 1998 and more generally Young 1993). This
reduction of ambiguity is „ inductive”  rather than deductive and clearly not
deduced from the theory t that specifies the rationality concept for the context
under consideration.
7. Causality and absorbability of advice
Both, theories of fully rational behavior as well as theories of purely adaptive
behavior, avoid the problem of explicitly modeling the causal influence of a
theory t and its advice on actual behavior. Theories of fully rational behavior not
only assume that (C) and (K) are fulfilled, but also that behavior is fully
compliant with t. Therefore, theories of fully rational behavior can predict
behavior as being coincident with their own advice. The advice itself is derived
on the assumption that prescribed and predicted behavior amount to the same
among fully rational beings. This full rationality approach is coherent, but one
should not forget that it is based on assumptions rather than on empirical laws or
findings. Likewise, a purely adaptive „non-rational”  approach is based on
assumptions that abstract away the higher faculties of the mind, in particular
those that enable the understanding of theories. Due to this abstraction, theories
of non-rational, purely adaptive behavior eliminate the problem of modeling the
causal influence of the theory t of behavior on behavior. Starting from the
premise that there is no causal influence of the theory t on behavior at all, t can
treat behavior parametrically and predict it without referring to t and its advice.
Neglecting the causal influence of a theory t of rational behavior on behavior
may be adequate in some extreme cases. But in many non-extreme situations it
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may distort the facts. Moreover, there is no good reason to assume that
intermediate cases can be treated by a kind of convex-combination of the
treatment of the extreme cases. What is needed is some theory that fills the
middle ground. This theory should incorporate some of the idealizations
characteristic of theories of fully rational behavior and at the same time observe
some essential facts and constraints influencing actual choice making. As far as
such theories are concerned Tietz (1992) has coined the concept of a „ semi-
normative theory” . A semi-normative theory t takes into account some stylized
facts of actual human behavior considered rational according to some
convention or other. At the same time, a semi-normative theory tries to adhere to
some idealization of behavior. In particular when deriving theoretical advice, it
is assumed that individuals are aware of the presence of other individuals and
their reasoning in ways akin to the assumptions (C) and (K), as conventionally
used in theories of full rationality.
A semi-normative theory t assumes that individuals have only a limited capacity
for behaving according to t’ s best advice. But they can be influenced by the
theory, and therefore the theory t’ s advice must take into account the theory’s
own causal effects on behavior. For example, if in the game of figure 3 player 2
comes to the conclusion that theory t provides player 1 with the advice to play
s
2
1 , then player 2 would not want to use all her strategies with equal probability
but rather single out s
2
2 . A theory t that would suggest that player 2 play each of
her strategies with equal probability, while player 1 receives the advice to play
his second strategy with probability 1, would seem incoherent not only among
fully but also boundedly rational individuals.
For semi-normative theories t as for theories of ideal rationality, the problem of
absorption of the theory t, (D.6), does play a role. As opposed to the counter-
factual assumptions of normative theories of full rationality in the world of
semi-normative rationality, the causal effect of the theory itself must be viewed
as subject to factual laws. Therefore, in formulating a convincing semi-
normative theory t, we need to address the problem of how the predictive
content of t relates to t’ s prescriptive content. If in a game G some advice ϕ(G)
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is given, then all depends on what players make of it. This is an empirical issue
to be addressed by the theory t of behavior used for deriving the advice. For
instance player 2 must ask himself what he assumes player 1 to make of the
advice ϕ(G); where ϕ(G) is possibly derived from the same theory t that is used
to predict the behavior of using the advice. Even among boundedly rational
players the thinking of player 1 may include his thoughts about the thought
processes of player 2. Even a merely boundedly rational player 1 might ask
questions like the following: What will player 2 make of the advice ϕ2(G)? If
|ϕ2(G)|>1, then player 1 may ask how likely it is that player 2 upon receiving the
advice ϕ2(G) will choose any of the alternatives in ϕ2(G).
What is needed – including the case of unique advice – is an empirical theory of
the process in which choices are in fact made and how advice once developed is
itself processed in view of such an empirical theory of decision processes. This
search is complicated by certain self-referential elements since the theory of
(boundedly) rational behavior from which advice is derived can – and in general
will – itself causally influence the process. The theory t is one of the informa-
tional inputs into the process of boundedly rational decision making. But,
whatever we may assume about the role of the theory and its advice, in the last
resort the effects of the theory and its advice are causal rather than logical. The
theory must be assessed in causal rather than logical terms.
Tietz (see again 1992) suggests that semi-normative theories t be tested by
inquiring to what extent such a theory t could become known among all
boundedly rational individuals and be followed by them without self-refutation.
As in the standard case of theories of fully rational behavior (D.6), all
individuals should be in a position to assume that all other individuals follow t
and still have no incentive to deviate from the theory’s advice. This „ test”  looks
quite similar to a standard equilibrium condition. This familiarity may seem
advantageous at first glance, but not on closer examination. For it is based on the
assumption that all individuals follow t, rather than on an empirical theory of
how many individuals can in fact be expected to follow t and to what extent. The
challenge is to formulate a semi-normative theory t of boundedly rational
behavior that contains an empirical prediction about the extent to which it will
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itself be accepted by players who are aware of it and causally influence their
behavior. Addressing this issue may bring us closer, too, to a solution of the
conceptual problem of what makes the behavior predicted by an explanatory
valid theory t of boundedly rational behavior a „ rational“  rather than a merely
„predicted“  behavior.
8. Conclusions
In view of the desired continuity with common intuitions about what is rational,
we may want to modify the rationality concept. Certain kinds of behavior that
are not captured by the classical concept of rationality can then be classified as
rational. To put it slightly otherwise, behavior that is deemed non-rational by
concepts of full rationality, but seems rational to common sense can be treated
as fully rational then. At the same time, the theory will not imply advice such as
never to cooperate in a centipede game. It will therefore itself not be potentially
subversive for proclivities to cooperate if co-operation is – at least potentially –
highly profitable without imposing high risks.
Still, the insistence that one of the emerging non-extreme explications of the
concept of rationality should be taken as the ideal type or the limiting case of
full rationality raises doubts for the very reason that it is not an extreme case. In
particular, if we believe that human behavior is characterized by the faculty (an
ability rather than a vice) of acting opportunistically, then this tends to drive us
to extremes. Along with the assumption that individuals are able to engage in
increasing levels of reflection it almost implies the principle of backward
induction. Beings who command the faculty of engaging in forward-looking
opportunistically rational choice, aiming at states that are to their individual
benefit, will be advised to follow the logic of choosing the best action in terms
of the anticipated future (causal) consequences. If we take this seriously, then
the „ rational”  in „boundedly rational behavior”  will always be „ imperfect” .
On the other hand, if we look at behavior as being purely adaptive, then theories
and the advice derived from them will play no role. Purely adaptive views of
human behavior are questionable precisely because they neglect their own
20.02.2001 26
impact on behavior. Best reply dynamics, however sophisticated they may be,
cannot pass the test demanding of them to take into account the impact of
theories of such dynamics on the dynamics themselves. As the example of the
so-called „ self-fulfill ing prophecy”  shows, social scientists have been aware of
the effect of „ theoretical”  predictions on behavior for a long time. But like their
game theoretic peers, they did not contribute much to reaching the middle
ground between theories of perfect rationality and theories of no-rationality. We
need to specify the meaning of „ rational”  in theories of boundedly rational
behavior and at the same time take into account the facts of behavioral
adaptation.
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